

# Secure NOMA and OMA coordinated transmission schemes in untrusted relay networks

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Dear editor,

Safeguarding physical-layer non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) transmissions using relays has been received widespread attention [1,2]. However, a relay may be data-level untrusted and serve as an eavesdropper to decode its forwarded messages. Hence, information security needs to be guaranteed if an untrusted relay is involved.

In the literature, only limited studies (such as [3–6]) studied secure NOMA against an untrusted relay, where a typical two-user scenario (one near user and one far user) is considered. Up to now, a multi-user NOMA with an untrusted relay has not been investigated yet. Theoretically, in a multi-user scenario, an appropriate joint design of user scheduling and cooperative jamming can significantly improve the signal reception quality of the legitimate users as well as degrading the decoding capability of the untrusted relay, which is beneficial to the physical-layer security. Furthermore, although the use of NOMA increases the ergodic secrecy sum rate, the ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) of the far user does not increase with the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) but converges to a constant in the high SNR regime [6]. This fails to balance the rate performance between the near user and far user and cannot promise user fairness. How to design a user fairness oriented secrecy transmission scheme is still not known.

Motivated by the above observations, this work investigates a secrecy transmission design for untrusted relay networks with multiple near users and a far user, where novel secure NOMA and OMA coordinated transmission schemes are proposed to combat an untrusted relay. The performance of the proposed schemes is evaluated theoretically and numerically. The results show that the NOMA scheme achieves a high sum ESR, while the OMA scheme balances the ESR between the near user and far user, thereby guaranteeing user fairness with secrecy considerations.

*System model and scheme description.* We consider a cooperative network with a source  $S$ , an untrusted relay  $R$ , a far user  $F$ , and  $K$  near users  $\{N_1, \dots, N_K\}$ . The direct  $S$ - $F$  channel does not exist owing to severe path-loss atten-

uation. Thus,  $S$  communicates with  $F$  via  $R$ , while directly communicating with  $\{N_1, \dots, N_K\}$ . All wireless channels are assumed to be reciprocal and quasi-static with independent Rayleigh fading. The channel between nodes  $i$  and  $j$  is denoted by  $h_{ij} \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, \lambda_{ij})$  for  $i, j \in \{s, r, f, 1, \dots, K\}$  and  $i \neq j$ . We assume that  $\lambda_{sk} = \lambda_{sn}$ ,  $\lambda_{rk} = \lambda_{rn}$ ,  $k \in \mathcal{K} = \{1, \dots, K\}$ , and  $\lambda_{sn} > \lambda_{sr}$ . The additive white Gaussian noise at node  $i$  is denoted by  $\eta_i \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, \lambda_0)$  for  $i \in \{s, r, f, 1, \dots, K\}$ .

(1) NOMA scheme. In the first time slot, assuming that  $N_k$  is scheduled as the receiving near user,  $S$  transmits a superimposed signal of  $x_k$  and  $x_f$  to  $N_k$  and  $R$ , where  $x_k \in \mathcal{CN}(0, 1)$  and  $x_f \in \mathcal{CN}(0, 1)$  are the signals intended for  $N_k$  and  $F$ . Simultaneously, the remaining  $(K - 1)$  near users (called jammers) cooperatively transmit a jamming signal  $z \in \mathcal{CN}(0, 1)$  to confuse  $R$ . The received signals at  $N_k$  and  $R$  are written as

$$y_i = \sqrt{\alpha_k P} h_{si} x_k + \sqrt{\alpha_f P} h_{si} x_f + \sqrt{P} \mathbf{h}_i \mathbf{f}_1 z + \eta_i, \quad i \in \{k, r\}, \quad (1)$$

where  $P$  is the transmit power,  $\alpha_k$  and  $\alpha_f$  are the power allocation coefficients satisfying  $\alpha_k + \alpha_f = 1$  and  $\alpha_f > \alpha_k$ ,  $\mathbf{h}_k$  and  $\mathbf{h}_r$  denote the channels from jammers to  $N_k$  and  $R$ , and  $\mathbf{f}_1$  denotes the beamforming vector. To guarantee that  $z$  will not affect the signal reception of  $N_k$ , the beamforming vector should be designed based on the zero-forcing metric, i.e.,  $\mathbf{h}_k \mathbf{f}_1 = 0$  and  $\mathbf{f}_1^H \mathbf{f}_1 = 1$ . In this time slot,  $F$  can receive and cache  $z$  for the subsequent jamming cancellation.

In the second time slot,  $R$  forwards its received signals to  $F$ . To compensate the jamming service offered by the jammers, one jammer, say  $\bar{N}_k$ , is scheduled to receive its own signal  $\bar{x}_k \in \mathcal{CN}(0, 1)$  in this time slot. Coordinated with  $R$ 's transmission,  $S$  transmits a superimposed signal of  $\bar{x}_k$  and  $x_k$  to  $\bar{N}_k$ , where  $x_k$  is used to enable  $\bar{N}_k$ 's interference cancellation. The received signals at  $F$  and  $\bar{N}_k$  are

$$y_f = \varphi_1 h_{rf} y_r + \eta_f, \quad (2)$$

$$y_{\bar{k}} = \varphi_1 h_{r\bar{k}} y_r + h_{s\bar{k}} (\sqrt{P - P_k} \bar{x}_k + w_k x_k) + \eta_{\bar{k}}, \quad (3)$$

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where  $\varphi_1 = \sqrt{1/(\lambda_{sr} + \lambda_{rn} + 1/\rho)}$  is the relay amplifying gain,  $P_k$  is the transmit power of  $x_k$ , and  $w_k$  is the weighting coefficient of  $x_k$  satisfying  $\mathbb{E}[|w_k|^2] = P_k$ . Owing to  $R$ 's half-duplex feature, it cannot listen to  $S$ 's signal transmission, and the transmission of  $\bar{x}_k$  is secured.

The detailed signal detection and performance metric are shown in Appendix A.

User scheduling. We propose an user scheduling criterion as follows:

$$k^* = \arg \max_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \gamma_{k:x_k}, \quad \bar{k}^* = \arg \max_{k \in \mathcal{K} \setminus k^*} \gamma_{\bar{k}:\bar{x}_k}, \quad (4)$$

where  $\gamma_{k:x_k}$  and  $\gamma_{\bar{k}:\bar{x}_k}$  are given in Appendix A.

**Lemma 1.** The user scheduling (4) is optimal in maximizing the secrecy rates of  $x_k$ ,  $x_f$ , and  $\bar{x}_k$ .

*Proof.* See Appendix B.

(2) OMA scheme. In the first time slot,  $S$  transmits  $x_f$  to  $R$  and all  $\{N_1, \dots, N_K\}$  transmit  $z$  in a collaborative manner to intentionally confuse  $R$ . The received signals at  $R$  are given by

$$y_r = \sqrt{P}h_{sr}x_f + \sqrt{P}h_{rn}\mathbf{f}_2z + \eta_r, \quad (5)$$

where  $h_{rn}$  is the channels between  $\{N_1, \dots, N_K\}$  and  $R$ , and  $\mathbf{f}_2$  is the beamforming vector given by  $\mathbf{f}_2 = [h_{r1}^\dagger/|h_{r1}|, \dots, h_{rK}^\dagger/|h_{rK}|]^T$ . In this slot,  $F$  also receives  $z$  and caches it for the subsequent jamming cancellation.

In the second time slot,  $R$  forwards its received signals to  $F$  and  $S$  coordinately transmits a superimposed signal of  $x_k$  and  $x_f$  to  $N_k$ , where  $x_f$  is aimed at  $N_k$ 's interference cancellation. The received signals at  $F$  and  $N_k$  are

$$y_f = \varphi_2 h_{rf} y_r + \eta_f, \quad (6)$$

$$y_k = \varphi_2 h_{rk} y_r + h_{sk} \left( \sqrt{P - P_f} x_k + w_f x_f \right) + \eta_k, \quad (7)$$

where  $\varphi_2 = \sqrt{1/(\lambda_{sr} + \bar{\mu}_r + 1/\rho)}$  denotes the relay amplifying gain in OMA with  $\bar{\mu}_r = \mathbb{E}[\mu_r]$ ,  $P_f$  is the transmit power of  $x_f$ , and  $w_f$  is the weighting coefficient of  $x_f$  with  $\mathbb{E}[|w_f|^2] = P_f$ . While  $R$  cannot overhear the transmitted signals from  $S$  in this time slot owing to the half-duplex constraint.

The detailed signal detection and performance metric are discussed in Appendix C.

User scheduling. The near user who has the largest SNR is scheduled as follows:

$$k^* = \arg \max_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \hat{\gamma}_{k:x_k}, \quad (8)$$

where  $\hat{\gamma}_{k:x_k}$  is defined in Appendix C. Clearly, this user scheduling maximizes the secrecy rate of  $x_k$ .

(3) Implementation. For the proposed schemes, the following channel state information (CSI) is assumed:  $S$  and  $N_k$  know  $h_{sr}$ ,  $h_{sk}$ , and  $h_{rk}$  to set the weighting coefficients and perform cooperative jamming and user scheduling. The CSI can be estimated using the channel training method similar to [6], where details are omitted owing to page limit.

Using the available CSI, user scheduling can be implemented in a distributed manner. To be specific, each  $N_k$  uses a virtual timer and sets an initial value for the timer in inversely proportional to  $\gamma_{k:x_k}$  and  $\gamma_{\bar{k}:\bar{x}_k}$  in NOMA and  $\hat{\gamma}_{k:x_k}$  in OMA. The near user whose timer expires first is selected as the best one for signal reception.

*Main results.* We derive the ESR lower bound and its scaling law.

**Theorem 1.** The NOMA scheme achieves a positive sum ESR, which indicates that perfect secrecy is definitely guaranteed.

*Proof.* See Appendix D.

**Corollary 1.** With a finite  $K$  and  $\rho \rightarrow \infty$ , we obtain that: (1) the ESR of  $N_k$  scales as  $\frac{1}{2} \log \rho$ ; (2) the ESR of  $\bar{N}_k$  scales as  $\frac{1}{2} \log \rho$ , which is achieved by the power allocation of  $\alpha_f = \frac{c}{\rho}$  given a positive constant  $c$ , otherwise, the ESR of  $\bar{N}_k$  converges to a constant; (3) the ESR of  $F$  converges to a constant.

When  $\rho$  is limited and  $K \rightarrow \infty$ , we achieve that: (1) the ESR of  $N_k$  scales as  $\frac{1}{2} \log \log K$ ; (2) the ESR of  $\bar{N}_k$  scales as  $\frac{1}{2} \log \log(K-1)$ ; (3) the ESR of  $F$  finally converges to a constant.

*Proof.* See Appendix E.

**Theorem 2.** The OMA scheme achieves a positive sum ESR, thus ensuring perfect secrecy.

*Proof.* See Appendix F.

**Corollary 2.** With a finite  $K$  and  $\rho \rightarrow \infty$ , the ESRs of  $N_k$  and  $F$  both scale as  $\frac{1}{2} \log \rho$ .

When  $\rho$  is limited and  $K \rightarrow \infty$ , we obtain that: (1) the ESR of  $N_k$  scales as  $\frac{1}{2} \log \log K$ ; (2) the ESR of  $F$  converges to a constant.

*Proof.* Similar to the proof of Corollary 1.

Simulation results are provided in Appendix G to verify the derived analytical results and demonstrate the secrecy enhancement of the proposed schemes.

*Discussion.* The proposed schemes can be extended to a scenario with multiple far users. For both NOMA and OMA schemes, one best far user who has the largest received SINR is chosen as the receiver to enhance the signal reception quality.

The proposed schemes can also be extended to a multiple-relay scenario, where all relays perform distributed beamforming to forward the received signals to the far user. The beamforming vector  $\mathbf{f}_2$  of the near users is designed to simultaneously jam all relays.

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**Supporting information** Appendixes A–G. The supporting information is available online at [info.scichina.com](http://info.scichina.com) and [link.springer.com](http://link.springer.com). The supporting materials are published as submitted, without typesetting or editing. The responsibility for scientific accuracy and content remains entirely with the authors.

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