

• Supplementary File •

Fast Substitution-Box Evaluation Algorithm and Its Efficient Higher-Order Masking Scheme for Block Ciphers

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Appendix A Proof of Theorem 1

If a is the primitive root, then all elements over $GF(2^n)$ can be generated from (A1).

$$x_i = a^i \pmod{p}, i \in [0, 2^n - 1] \quad (\text{A1})$$

Since,

$$x^{2^n - 1} \equiv x^{mk} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \quad (\text{A2})$$

Here, a^k is one solution of $x^m \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$, hence all solutions satisfy,

$$x_j = a^{jk} \pmod{p}, j \in \mathbb{N} \quad (\text{A3})$$

Since the equation only has m solutions, hence this theorem is proven.

Appendix B Proof of Theorem 2

The k of m -degree congruence equations can be constructed as:

$$\begin{cases} x^m \equiv b_1 \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \\ x^m \equiv b_2 \pmod{p} \\ \dots\dots\dots \\ x^m \equiv b_{k-1} \pmod{p} \\ x^m \equiv b_k \pmod{p} \end{cases} \quad (\text{B1})$$

Since $b_j, j \in [2, k]$ are solutions of $x^k \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$, then

$$b_j = a^{(j-1)m} \pmod{p}, j \in [1, m] \quad (\text{B2})$$

Hence, multiplying both sides of (B1) by b_j from (B2) proves this theorem.

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Appendix C **Table C1**

Table C1 Solutions of the high-degree congruence with factoring pairs

n	Factors	p	m	x satisfies $x^m \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$
4	(3, 5)	$x^4 + x + 1$	3	1, 6, 7
			5	1, 8, 10, 12, 15
6	(3, 21)	$x^6 + x + 1$	3	1, 58, 59
			21	1, 3, 5, 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 40, 43, 51, 54, 57, 58, 59, 62
	(7, 9)		7	1, 14, 15, 22, 23, 24, 25
			9	1, 6, 11, 20, 26, 28, 31, 58, 59
8	(3, 85)	$x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^1 + 1$	3	1, 188, 189
			85	1, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 21, 22, 29, 36, 38, 41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 64, 66, 67, 68, 74, 80, 83, 85, 96, 98, 99, 102, 103, 107, 111, 115, 117, 120, 124, 127, 130, 133, 137, 139, 140, 146, 156, 158, 161, 162, 163, 168, 171, 174, 175, 176, 179, 181, 182, 187, 194, 195, 199, 202, 205, 209, 210, 211, 213, 217, 219, 223, 232, 237, 239, 242, 243, 247, 249, 252
	(5, 51)		5	1, 12, 80, 176, 237
			51	1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 27, 29, 32, 37, 47, 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 64, 74, 77, 94, 97, 99, 102, 106, 108, 114, 116, 125, 128, 131, 141, 145, 148, 151, 154, 159, 171, 179, 188, 189, 194, 197, 198, 203, 204, 211, 212, 216, 228, 232, 239, 250
	(15, 17)		15	1, 12, 13, 80, 81, 92, 93, 176, 177, 188, 189, 224, 225, 236, 237
			17	1, 8, 29, 47, 53, 54, 57, 64, 74, 99, 102, 171, 179, 194, 211, 232, 239
9	(7, 73)	$x^9 + x^4 + 1$	7	1, 28, 29, 332, 333, 336, 337
			73	1, 9, 23, 24, 41, 42, 43, 49, 60, 61, 62, 65, 70, 76, 88, 89, 94, 99, 102, 103, 111, 112, 127, 128, 137, 147, 156, 158, 162, 175, 183, 190, 191, 208, 216, 227, 255, 262, 266, 277, 286, 291, 298, 301, 308, 320, 326, 327, 331, 334, 353, 357, 362, 363, 364, 370, 371, 374, 378, 400, 406, 426, 441, 456, 457, 462, 469, 476, 481, 501, 502, 505, 511

Appendix D **Algorithm D1**

Algorithm D1 Higher-order masking scheme for GLUT

Input: Boolean shares $xa_0, xa_1, xa_2, \dots, xa_d$ of x
Output: Boolean shares $y = GLUT(x) \oplus xb_1 \oplus xb_2 \dots \oplus xb_d, xb_1, xb_2, \dots, xb_d$
***BM to MM operation*
1: $(xm_0, xm_1, \dots, xm_d) = BMtoMM(xa_0, xa_1, \dots, xa_d); \setminus \setminus$ Alg. D2
*** Table re-computation*
2: **for** $n = 1$ to d
3: Random generates $xb_n \in GF(2^n); \setminus \setminus$ Masks refreshing
4: $GLUT'(u) \leftarrow GLUT(u \otimes xm_n) \oplus xb_n;$
 $\setminus \setminus$ Re-computation
5: $y \leftarrow GLUT'(xm_0);$
6: **end**
7: **return** $y, xb_1, xb_2, \dots, xb_d.$

Algorithm D2**Algorithm D2** BM to MM

Input: Boolean shares $xa_0, xa_1, xa_2, \dots, xa_d$
Output: Multiplicative shares $xm_0, xm_1, xm_2, \dots, xm_d$

- 1: $xm_0 = xa_0$;
- 2: **for** $n = 1$ to d
- 3: Random generates $i \in [1, k], j \in [1, m]$;
- 4: $xm_n = M_{ij}$;
- 5: $xm_0 = xm_0 \otimes xm_n$;
- 6: **for** $k = 1$ to $d - n$
- 7: Random generates $r \in [0, 255]$; // Masks refreshing
- 8: $xa_k = xm_n \otimes xa_k$;
- 9: $xa_k = r \otimes xa_k$;
- 10: $xm_0 = r \oplus xa_k$;
- 11: $xa_k = r$;
- 12: **end**
- 13: $xa_{d-n+1} = xm_n \otimes xa_{d-n+1}$;
- 14: $xm_0 = xm_0 \oplus xa_{d-n+1}$;
- 15: **end**
- 16: **return** $xm_0, xm_1, xm_2, \dots, xm_d$.

Appendix E Table E1**Table E1** Computing-complexity of different arithmetic modules.

	XOR	Multiplication	LUT access
F_2 -linear	0	0	$d + 1$
Multiplication over $GF(2^n)$	$2(d^2 + d)$	$(d + 1)^2$	0
$x \times g(x)$	$5(d^2 + d)$	0	$2d^2 + 3d + 1$
GLUT	$d^2 + d$	$(d(d + 3))/2$	d

Table E2**Table E2** Computing-complexity of different AEs S-boxes.

	XOR	Multiplication	LUT access
[6]	$8(d^2 + d)$	$4(d + 1)^2$	$7(d + 1)$
[7]	$8(d^2 + d)$	$4(d + 1)^2$	$11(d + 1)$
[8]	$8(d^2 + d)$	$4(d + 1)^2$	$6(d + 1)$
[9]	$17(d^2 + d)$	$(d + 1)^2$	$6d^2 + 15d + 10$
This paper	$3(d^2 + d)$	$(3d^2 + 7d + 2)/2$	$5d + 4$