

Theoretical Analysis of Persistent Fault Attack

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Appendix A In the early work

Let n, η denote the number of all values and possible values, respectively. $n = 256$ and $\eta = n - 1 = 255$ for 8-bit bytes. Suppose the adversary can collect i ciphertexts after the encryption. Parts of them are faulty. Let θ_i be the “average” number of different values that he has observed for one specific ciphertext byte. Then, we can derive the following according to [1]:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \theta_1 &= 1, \\
 \theta_2 &= \frac{\eta - \theta_1}{\eta} + \theta_1, \\
 \theta_3 &= \frac{\eta - \theta_2}{\eta} + \theta_2, \\
 &\dots \\
 \theta_i &= \frac{1 - q^i}{1 - q}, \text{ where } q = \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{A1}$$

Since $\eta = \frac{1}{1-q}$, when $\theta_i \rightarrow \eta = \frac{1}{1-q}$, from Eq. (A1) we have:

$$\theta_i = \frac{1 - q^i}{1 - q} \rightarrow \eta = \frac{1}{1 - q}.$$

It only states that θ_i will converge to $\eta = 255$ eventually ($i \rightarrow +\infty$), but did not give a theoretical expectation value of i when θ_i equals η for the first time.

Appendix B In Case 1

Suppose t_j denotes the number of additional ciphertexts that is required to output a new value after $j - 1$ different values observed. T denotes the total number of the ciphertexts that is required when all possible values observed. $T = \sum_{j=1}^{n-1} t_j$ and $t_1 = 1$.

Since the distribution of possible values is uniform, when the $(j - 1)$ -th value has been observed, the next new value comes with a fixed probability determined by j : $p_j = \frac{n-j}{n-1}$. Also, random variables t_j are independent.

Then we can easily derive this:

$$\begin{aligned}
 E(T) &= \sum_{j=1}^{n-1} E(t_j) \\
 &= \sum_{j=1}^{n-1} \frac{1}{p_j}
 \end{aligned}$$

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$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \sum_{j=1}^{n-1} \frac{n-1}{n-j} \\
 &= (n-1) \times H_{n-1},
 \end{aligned} \tag{B1}$$

where

$$H_n = \frac{1}{1} + \frac{1}{2} + \cdots + \frac{1}{n}.$$

Appendix C In Case 2

Let T, X_i be the total number of ciphertexts in one attack process and the number of ciphertexts when the adversary first find the s_i value, respectively. $T = \max_{i=0,1,2,\dots,n-1} X_i$. So the expected number of ciphertexts $E(T)$ satisfies:

$$E(T) = E\left(\max_{i=0,1,2,\dots,n-1} X_i\right). \tag{C1}$$

For value s_j , the probability is p_j , $0 < j < n-1$, and $p_0 = 0, p_1 = \frac{2}{n}$, for other $i, p_i = \frac{1}{n}$. We can convert the maximum expression (Eq. (C1)) into a sum of a series of minimum expressions:

$$\begin{aligned}
 E(T) &= E\left(\max_{i=0,1,2,\dots,n-1} X_i\right) \\
 &= \sum_i E(X_i) - \sum_{i < j} E(\min(X_i, X_j)) + (-1)^{n+1} E(\min(X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n)) \\
 &= \sum_i \frac{1}{p_i} - \sum_{i < j} \frac{1}{p_i + p_j} + \cdots + (-1)^{n+1} \frac{1}{p_1 + \cdots + p_n} \\
 &= \sum_{k=1}^{n-2} (-1)^{k+1} \left(\binom{n-2}{k} \frac{n}{k} + \binom{n-2}{k-1} \frac{n}{k+1} \right) + (-1)^n.
 \end{aligned}$$

This formula is not feasible to compute for computers because of the large permutation number $\binom{n-2}{k}$ and $\binom{n-2}{k-1}$. To make it easier to compute, we can make some transformation.

To construct an expression like Eq. (C2), using the idea of generating function:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (1-x)^{n-2} &= \sum_{k=0}^{n-2} \binom{n-2}{k} (-x)^k \\
 (1-x)^{n-2} &= \sum_{k=0}^{n-2} \binom{n-2}{k} (-1)^k (x)^k \\
 (1-x)^{n-2} &= \sum_{k=1}^{n-2} \binom{n-2}{k} (-1)^k (x)^k + 1 \\
 \frac{(1-x)^{n-2}-1}{x} &= \sum_{k=1}^{n-2} \binom{n-2}{k} (-1)^k x^{k-1} \\
 \int_0^1 \frac{(1-x)^{n-2}-1}{x} dx &= \sum_{k=1}^{n-2} \binom{n-2}{k} (-1)^k \frac{x^k}{k} \Big|_{x=0}^1 \\
 &= \sum_{k=1}^{n-2} \binom{n-2}{k} (-1)^k \frac{1}{k}.
 \end{aligned}$$

Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned}
 (1-x)^{n-2} &= \sum_{k=0}^{n-2} \binom{n-2}{k} (-1)^k x^k \\
 (1-x)^{n-2} &= \sum_{k=1}^{n-1} \binom{n-2}{k-1} (-1)^{k-1} x^{k-1} \\
 (1-x)^{n-2} &= \sum_{k=1}^{n-1} \binom{n-2}{k-1} (-1)^{k+1} x^{k-1} \\
 x((1-x)^{n-2} - (-1)^n x^{n-2}) &= \sum_{k=1}^{n-2} \binom{n-2}{k-1} (-1)^{k+1} x^k \\
 \int_0^1 (x((1-x)^{n-2} - (-1)^n x^{n-2})) dx &= \sum_{k=1}^{n-2} \binom{n-2}{k-1} (-1)^{k+1} \frac{1}{k+1}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{C2}$$

Thus, the origin form can be converted to:

$$E(T) = -n \int_0^1 \frac{(1-x)^{n-2} - 1}{x} dx + n \int_0^1 (x(1-x)^{n-1} - (-1)^n x^{n-1}) dx + (-1)^n. \quad (C3)$$

Eq. (C3) avoids the computation of large permutation numbers.

References

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