

Impacts of outdated CSI for secure cooperative systems with opportunistic relay selection

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Dear editor,

Cooperative relaying has been proven to be capable of improving the reliability and throughput of wireless transmissions [1, 2], and thus its application in physical layer security communication systems has recently been intensively investigated to enhance the secrecy performance against eavesdropping attacks [3, 4]. In particular, in the multiple-relay systems where one or more eavesdroppers try to overhear the re-transmissions from the relays, several relay selection schemes were studied in [4], due to their advantages in lower cost and complexity over other techniques, such as cooperative jamming [5] and cooperative beamforming [3].

Much efforts have been devoted to investigating the impacts of outdated CSI (channel state information) on the performance of relay selection in cooperative relay systems without eavesdroppers [6]. Meanwhile, for secure cooperative systems with outdated CSI, the performance of joint relay and jammer selection was studied in [7]. However, the existing works provide neither exact closed-form expressions nor asymptotic anal-

ysis for the secrecy performance of DF (decode-and-forward) relay selection using outdated CSI. This letter is mainly concerned about the analysis of the secrecy performances for secure DF relay systems with outdated CSI on Nakagami- m fading channels.

System models. We consider a dual-hop half-duplex relaying secure communication system, which consists of one source S with single antenna, a set of K adaptive decode-and-forward (DF) relays R_k ($k = 1, \dots, K$) with single antenna, one destination D with N_D antenna and one eavesdropper E with N_E antenna. The S - D and S - E links are unavailable due to long distances. For three types of links S - R_k , R_k - D , and R_k - E , $k = 1, \dots, K$, the channel coefficients are represented by h_{SR_k} , $\mathbf{h}_{R_k D}$ and $\mathbf{h}_{R_k E}$, respectively. The channel coefficients follow independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Nakagami- m distributions with parameters m_{SR} , m_{RD} and m_{RE} , respectively. The received noise at R_k , D , and E are assumed as additive white Gaussian noise with zero-mean and variances $\sigma_{R_k}^2$, σ_D^2 , and σ_E^2 .

The transmission duration is divided into two

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time slots, and each time slot is allocated with a constant transmit power P . In the first time slot, S broadcasts the source signal, and the SNR at R_k is $\gamma_{R_k} = P|h_{SR_k}|^2/\sigma_{R_k}^2$. If the mutual information between S and R_k is greater than a certain target transmission rate R_{th} , the relay R_k can correctly decode and forward the source signal to D . In this case, R_k is belong to a decoding set \mathcal{D} . In the second time slot, the best relay R_{k^*} in \mathcal{D} is selected by D . In the absence of the eavesdropper's CSI, the relay that maximizes the instantaneous SNR at D is selected in order to achieve the best transmission performance. To maximize the instantaneous received SNRs at D and E , the maximal ratio combining (MRC) receiver is assumed at both nodes. The mutual information over the two links $R_{k^*}-D$ and $R_{k^*}-E$ are computed as $C_D = \frac{1}{2} \log_2(1 + \gamma_D)$ and $C_E = \frac{1}{2} \log_2(1 + \gamma_E)$, where $\gamma_D = P\|\mathbf{h}_{R_{k^*}D}\|^2/\sigma_D^2$ and $\gamma_E = P\|\mathbf{h}_{R_{k^*}E}\|^2/\sigma_E^2$ are the instantaneous SNRs. The instantaneous secrecy rate can be calculated by

$$C_S^{(|\mathcal{D}|)} = \begin{cases} 0, & |\mathcal{D}| = 0, \\ [C_D - C_E]^+, & |\mathcal{D}| > 0, \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

where $[x]^+ \triangleq \max\{0, x\}$, and $|\mathcal{D}|$ denotes the number of relays contained in the decoding set \mathcal{D} .

In practice, the CSI of any R_k-D link used for relay selection is usually inaccurate and outdated with respect to the actual channel. We consider the channel feedback error model for the links $R_k - D$ below [6]:

$$\mathbf{h}_{R_k D}(t) = \rho \mathbf{h}_{R_k D}(t - \tau) + \sqrt{1 - \rho^2} \mathbf{e}(t), \quad (2)$$

where ρ is the normalized correlation coefficient between $\mathbf{h}_{R_k D}(t)$ and $\mathbf{h}_{R_k D}(t - \tau)$ for delay τ , and $\mathbf{e}(t)$ is the error vector incurred from the feedback delay.

Secrecy performance metrics. The secrecy outage probability (SOP) is defined as the probability that the achievable secrecy rate $C_S^{(|\mathcal{D}|)}$ is less than a given secrecy rate R_S , and can be formulated as

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{out}}(R_S) & \Pr\left(C_S^{(|\mathcal{D}|)} < R_S\right) \\ & = \sum_{L=0}^K \Pr(|\mathcal{D}| = L) \Pr\left(C_S^{(L)} < R_S \mid |\mathcal{D}| = L\right) \\ & = \sum_{L=0}^K \binom{K}{L} \left[1 - F_{\gamma_{R_k}}(\gamma_{th})\right]^L \left[F_{\gamma_{R_k}}(\gamma_{th})\right]^{K-L} \\ & \quad \times \int_0^\infty F_{\tilde{\gamma}_D}(\theta - 1 + \theta x) f_{\gamma_E}(x) dx, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where $\gamma_{th} = 2^{2R_{th}}$, $F_{\gamma_{R_k}}(x)$ and $F_{\tilde{\gamma}_D}(x)$ denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γ_{R_k} and $\tilde{\gamma}_D$, respectively, and $f_{\gamma_E}(x)$ denotes probability density function (PDF) of γ_E , those function can be obtained in similar ways as [6].

Thus, we can derive the closed-form expression for (3) following [8, Eq. (9.211.4)] upon substitution of $F_{\gamma_{R_k}}(x)$, $F_{\tilde{\gamma}_D}(x)$ and $f_{\gamma_E}(x)$ yields

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{out}}(R_S) & = \sum_{L=0}^K \sum_{l=0}^L \sum_{p=0}^{K-L+l} \sum_{q=0}^{(m_{SR}-1)p} \binom{K}{L} \binom{K-L+l}{p} \\ & \times \binom{L}{l} \left(\frac{m_{SR}}{\bar{\gamma}_R}\right)^q (-1)^{l+p} a_q^{p, m_{SR}} \gamma_{th}^q e^{-\frac{pm_{SR}}{\bar{\gamma}_R} \gamma_{th}} \\ & \times \left[1 - \sum_{u=0}^{L-1} \sum_{v=0}^{(N_D m_{RD}-1)u} \sum_{t_1=0}^v \sum_{t_2=0}^{N_D m_{RD}+t_1-1} \binom{L-1}{u}\right] \\ & \times \binom{v}{t_1} \left(\frac{m_{RD}}{\bar{\gamma}_D}\right)^{t_2} \left(\frac{m_{RE}}{\bar{\gamma}_E}\right)^{N_E m_{RE}} L (-1)^u a_v^{u, N_D m_{RD}} \\ & \times \frac{\rho^{t_1} (1-\rho)^{v-t_1} \Gamma(N_D m_{RD} + v) e^{-\frac{m_{RD}(1+u)(\theta-1)}{\xi \bar{\gamma}_D}}}{t_2! \xi^{v+t_2} \Gamma(N_D m_{RD}) (1+u)^{N_D m_{RD}+t_1-t_2}} \\ & \times \frac{(\theta-1)^{\beta_2}}{\theta^{N_E m_{RE}}} \Psi\left(N_E m_{RE}, \beta_2 + 1; \eta_2 \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}\right), \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where $\bar{\gamma}_R$, $\bar{\gamma}_D$, and $\bar{\gamma}_E$ denote the average SNRs at R_k , D , and E , respectively, $\theta = 2^{2R_S}$, $\xi = 1 + u(1 - \rho)$, $\eta_2 = m_{RD}(1 + u)\theta/(\xi \bar{\gamma}_D) + m_{RE}/\bar{\gamma}_E$, $\beta_2 = N_E m_{RE} + t_2$, $\Gamma(\cdot)$ and $\Psi(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ are the gamma function [8, Eq. (8.339.1)] and confluent hypergeometric function [8, Eq. (9.211.4)], respectively, and $a_n^{c,d}$ ($0 \leq n \leq c(d-1)$) for positive integers c and d is a constant defined in [2].

Asymptotic SOP. (1) $\bar{\gamma}_D \rightarrow \infty$ with fixed $\bar{\gamma}_R$: This is applicable in a scenario where D is located quite close to R_k . In this case, it is readily shown from (1) that for $|\mathcal{D}| > 0$, $C_S^{(|\mathcal{D}|)} \rightarrow \infty$. By (3), the secrecy outage event can happen only when $|\mathcal{D}| = 0$, i.e., none of the K relays can correctly decode the received source message. So, we have

$$P_{\text{out}}^{\bar{\gamma}_D \rightarrow \infty}(R_S) = \left[1 - \frac{\Gamma\left(m_{SR}, \frac{m_{SR}}{\bar{\gamma}_R} \gamma_{th}\right)}{\Gamma(m_{SR})}\right]^K, \quad (5)$$

where $\Gamma(\cdot, \cdot)$ denotes the incomplete gamma function [8, Eq. (8.352.2)].

(2) $\bar{\gamma}_D \rightarrow \infty$ and $\bar{\gamma}_R \rightarrow \infty$: In this case, D is located close to R_k and R_k is located close to S . We assume that $\bar{\gamma}_R$ is proportional to $\bar{\gamma}_D$. In high SNR regime where $\bar{\gamma}_R \rightarrow \infty$, all the relays can correctly decode the received message at high probability, i.e., $\Pr(|\mathcal{D}| = K) \rightarrow 1$ and $\Pr(|\mathcal{D}| = L) \rightarrow 0$ for $0 \leq L \leq K-1$. Therefore, substituting the asymptotic expression for $F_{\tilde{\gamma}_D}(x)$ [6] into (3) and solve the integral, we have

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\text{out}}^{\bar{\gamma}_R, \bar{\gamma}_D \rightarrow \infty}(R_S) & = \Pr\left(C_S^{(K)} < R_S \mid |\mathcal{D}| = K\right) \\ & = \begin{cases} \left(\tilde{\Phi} \bar{\gamma}_D\right)^{-\tilde{G}} + o\left(\bar{\gamma}_D^{-\tilde{G}}\right), & \rho < 1, \\ \left(\Phi \bar{\gamma}_D\right)^{-G} + o\left(\bar{\gamma}_D^{-G}\right), & \rho = 1, \end{cases} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$




Figure 1 (Color online) Exact and asymptotic SOP versus $\bar{\gamma}_D$ for (a) $R_{th} = R_S = 1$ bits/s/Hz, $\bar{\gamma}_R = 10$ dB, $\bar{\gamma}_E = 5$ dB, $m_{SR} = m_{RE} = 1$, $m_{RD} = 2$, and $\rho = 1$; (b) $R_{th} = R_S = 1$ bits/s/Hz, $\bar{\gamma}_R = \bar{\gamma}_D$, $\bar{\gamma}_E = 5$ dB, $N_D = N_E = 2$, and $m_{SR} = m_{RD} = m_{RE} = 2$.

where $o(\cdot)$ denotes the higher order terms, $\tilde{G} = N_D m_{RD}$ and $G = N_D m_{RD} K$ denote the secrecy diversity order, and the corresponding secrecy array gains can be given by

$$\tilde{\Phi} = \left[\frac{K m_{RD}^{N_D m_{RD}}}{\Gamma(N_D m_{RD})} \sum_{u=0}^{K-1} \sum_{v=0}^{(N_D m_{RD}-1)u} \binom{K-1}{u} (-1)^u \right. \\ \left. \times \frac{a_v^{u, N_D m_{RD}} m_{RE}^{N_E m_{RE}} (1-\rho)^v \Gamma(N_D m_{RD} + v) (\theta-1)^{\beta_3}}{\xi^{N_D m_{RD} + v} \bar{\gamma}_E^{N_E m_{RE}} \Gamma(N_D m_{RD} + 1) \theta^{N_E m_{RE}}} \right. \\ \left. \times \Psi \left(N_E m_{RE}, \beta_3 + 1; \frac{m_{RE} (\theta-1)}{\theta \bar{\gamma}_E} \right) \right]^{-\frac{1}{\tilde{G}}}, \quad (7)$$

$$\Phi = \left[\frac{m_{RD}^{N_D m_{RD} K} m_{RE}^{N_E m_{RE}} (\theta-1)^{N_D m_{RD} K + N_E m_{RE}}}{\theta^{N_E m_{RE}} \bar{\gamma}_E^{N_E m_{RE}} [\Gamma(N_D m_{RD} + 1)]^K} \right. \\ \left. \times \Psi \left(N_E m_{RE}, \beta_4; \frac{(\theta-1) m_{RE}}{\theta \bar{\gamma}_E} \right) \right]^{-\frac{1}{G}} \quad (8)$$

with shorthand notations $\beta_3 = N_D m_{RD} + N_E m_{RE}$ and $\beta_4 = N_D m_{RD} K + N_E m_{RE} + 1$.

Numerical results. Figure 1 evaluates the exact and asymptotic SOP performances versus $\bar{\gamma}_D$ by (4)–(6), respectively. In Figure 1(a), there is an evident decrease in exact SOP whether by increasing $\bar{\gamma}_D$, K , and N_D or by decreasing N_E . As $\bar{\gamma}_D$ grows large, all the exact SOP curves with K fixed approach a constant asymptotic SOP value dominated by the K value, regardless of the values of N_D and N_E . In Figure 1(b) we see that for given ρ , the SOP performances can be improved by increasing K . Meanwhile, for fixed K , an SOP gain can also be achieved by increasing ρ . However, for $\rho < 1$, the secrecy diversity order remains constant $\tilde{G} = N_D m_{RD}$. Only when $\rho = 1$, the full secrecy diversity order $G = N_D m_{RD} K$ can be obtained.

Conclusion. In this letter, we have investigated the secrecy performances of adaptive DF relay selection under Nakagami- m fading channels. We find that the SOP for the system can be significantly reduced by increasing the number of relays.

In particular, our asymptotic results can provide two valuable insights: (1) when D is located close to R_k , the SOP approaches a constant value with the zero secrecy diversity order; (2) when D is close to R_k while R_k is close to S , a positive secrecy diversity order can always be achieved by using outdated CSI, and the full secrecy diversity order can be obtained only by using perfect CSI.

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