

Improved linear (hull) cryptanalysis of round-reduced versions of SIMON

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Appendix A Introduction

The previous best linear characteristic that we are aware of for a key-recovery attack on SIMON128 is a 34-round linear characteristic with correlation 2^{-63} , as shown in [1]. Here we present one with correlation 2^{-61} . The 34-round linear characteristic can be used to mount a linear attack with a success rate of 99.7% with an 8-bit advantage on round-reduced SIMON by use of the method presented in [2]. In addition, the *potential* of the linear hulls we found on 13-round SIMON32, 15-round SIMON48, and 21- and 22-round SIMON64 are $2^{-28.99}$, $2^{-42.28}$, $2^{-60.72}$, and $2^{-63.83}$, respectively, while the *potential* of the previous best linear hulls for these versions are $2^{-31.69}$, $2^{-44.11}$, and $2^{-62.53}$, proposed in [1]. Using the 21-round linear hull, we present a 29-round key-recovery attack on SIMON64/128. The previous best cryptanalysis of this version was a 28-round differential cryptanalysis [1, 3].

For each linear characteristic, we obtain an accurate absolute value for the correlation of the linear approximation for each round by use of the nonsingular transform method presented in the main letter. Once the correlation in each round has been determined, the piling-up lemma is applied to obtain the absolute value of the correlation of the whole cipher, because S-boxes from different rounds can be seen as independent, given the effect of the round keys.

Appendix A.1 Linear characteristics

We performed experiments on SIMON128. A 34-round linear characteristic with correlation 2^{-61} was found. The linear mask (separated into left and right parts) is presented in Tables A1 and A2. To the best of our knowledge, the previous best 34-round characteristic of SIMON128 was presented in [1], with a correlation of 2^{-63} . A 43-round linear attack is presented with the 34-round linear characteristic in Figure A1, where 60 of the numbered subkey bits need to be guessed and the underlined ones shown in red do not.

The probability of success with an 8-bit advantage can be estimated using the method presented in [2] as follows:

$$P_s = \Phi(2\sqrt{N}|p - \frac{1}{2}| - \Phi^{-1}(1 - 2^{-8-1})), \quad (\text{A1})$$

where N is the number of known plaintexts, $|p - \frac{1}{2}| = \epsilon/2$, ϵ is the correlation, and Φ is the normal distribution. If we choose $N = 2^{127}$, the success probability is 99.7%. The previous best result achieving this probability is a 33-round characteristic with correlation 2^{-59} in [1].

For SIMON64, an 18-round linear characteristic with correlation 2^{-31} is listed in Table A3. The previous best linear characteristic with absolute value of the correlation no less than 2^{-31} is a 17-round linear characteristic with correlation 2^{-28} presented in [1]. For SIMON32 and SIMON48, similar results are found. Characteristics for SIMON32 and SIMON48 are listed in Tables A4 and A5. A comparison between our results and those of [1] is provided in Table A6. Examining the dependences among S-boxes is the primary focus of this letter.

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


Figure A1 Linear cryptanalysis of SIMON128/192,




Figure A2 Linear hull cryptanalysis of SIMON32/62




Figure A3 Linear hull cryptanalysis of SIMON48/96

Table A6 Comparison between our and other results

Version	# Rounds	correlation	Reference
SIMON32	11	2^{-15}	[1]
	11	2^{-15}	This paper
SIMON48	14	2^{-22}	[1]
	14	2^{-22}	This paper
SIMON64	17	2^{-28}	[1]
	18	2^{-31}	This paper
SIMON128	34	2^{-63}	[1]
	34	2^{-61}	This paper

Rounds: Number of rounds for linear characteristic.

Table A7 Input and output masks of the linear hulls

Version		The left half masks	The right half masks
SIMON32	First-round input	000000000100000	0000000000000000
	13th round output	0010000000000000	0000000000000000
SIMON48	First-round input	010001000100000001000000	000000010000000000000000
	15th round output	0101010000000000001000000	00010000000000000000010000
SIMON64	First-round input	00000000000000000000000001000000	00000000000000000000000000000000
	21st round output	010000000000000000000000000001000100	000000000000000000000000000000000001
SIMON64	First-round input	1000100000000000000000000000000001000	001000000000000000000000000000000000
	22nd round output	0000000000000000000000000000000000110	00000000000000000000000000000000001000

additional constraint $\sum_r \sum_{j=1}^n V^r[j] \leq 78$, 63,996 have nonzero correlation. This linear hull can be used to mount an attack on 29-round SIMON64/128, demonstrated in Figure A4. There were 63 guessed bits for the key. In addition, a 22-round linear hull with *potential* $2^{-63.83}$ for SIMON64 was found, with input and output masks listed in Table A7 and constraint $\sum_r \sum_{j=1}^n V^r[j] \leq 80$. This hull can be used to mount an attack on 29-round SIMON64/128 with 52 guessed key bits. The guessed subkeys are shown in Table A8. The data complexity N is set as ALH^{-1} . The time complexity is $N 2^{l_k}$,

Table A8 Guessed key bits for SIMON64

First round	3,4,6,7,8,10,11,13,14,15,17,21,31,32
Second round	2,5,6,9,13,30
Third round	-
26th round	-
27th round	6,7,31,32
28th round	1,2,5,7,8,9,14,15,30,32
29th round	1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,15,16,17,22,23,31,32

where l_k is the length of the guessed key. A summary of the results for linear hulls in this paper is presented in Table A9. For SIMON128, no meaningful result was obtained, as a result of limited computational resources. These results also show that taking the dependence of S-boxes into consideration is necessary where many characteristics have correlation 0.

Table A9 Summary of results with linear hulls

Version	# Rounds	Potential	# Returned	# Valid	# Attacked	Data	Time	Reference
SIMON32/64	13	$2^{-31.69}$	-	-	20	$2^{31.69}$	$2^{59.69}$	[1]
	13	$2^{-28.99}$	412206	196474	21	$2^{28.99}$	$2^{60.99}$	This paper
SIMON48/96	15	$2^{-44.11}$	-	-	20	$2^{44.11}$	$2^{80.11}$	[1]
	15	$2^{-42.28}$	50432	43524	21	$2^{42.28}$	$2^{93.28}$	This paper
SIMON64/128	21	$2^{-62.53}$	-	-	28	$2^{62.53}$	$2^{119.53}$	[1]
	21	$2^{-60.72}$	115199	63996	29	$2^{60.72}$	$2^{123.72}$	This paper
	22	$2^{-63.83}$	52840	28590	29	$2^{63.83}$	$2^{115.83}$	This paper

Rounds: Number of rounds for linear hull. # Returned: Number of characteristics returned by the model. # Valid: Number of characteristics with nonzero correlation. # Attacked: Number of attacked rounds.

References

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


Figure A4 Linear hull cryptanalysis of SIMON64/128

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